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This paper studies the effect on carbon dioxide emissions of the various agreements that 
follow the Long-Range Transboundary Air-Pollution Convention and are related to acid rain 
problems. The analysis is based on a panel dataset of 150 countries over the period 1970 - 
2008 and deals with the problems linked to the analysis of multiple agreements (e.g. time and 
membership overlap). We show that ratifying an additional treaty has a significant and 




International agreements to control transboundary externalities have received increasing 
attention from policy-makers and scholars, driven by the acknowledgement of global 
problems such as climate change or ozone layer depletion as well as more regional problems 
associated with acid rains. A common feature of these international treaties is that they are 
generally designed to control emissions of one single pollutant. For example, the Kyoto 
Protocol aims at reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, the main cause of global warming, 
while more conventional air-pollutants (e.g. sulfur dioxide SO2, nitrogen oxide NOx or 
volatile organic compounds VOC) are the targets of international treaties that follow the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air-Pollution (the 1979 LRTAP Convention, 
hereafter). 
 
In reality, a single source of emissions is typically composed of multiple pollutants that 
simultaneously cause global and/or more regional environmental damages. For example, 
Barker (1993, p. 9) calculated that in the United Kingdom, the burning of fossil fuels is 
responsible, apart from CO2 for over 99% of SO2 and NOx, 91% of particulate matter and 
38% of VOC emissions, which imply more regional or local environmental damages (e.g. 
acid rains, degradation of ambient air quality).1 
 
As they are emitted by a single source, existing abatement technologies may have joint effects 
on this multiplicity of pollutants. These effects can go in both directions. In this paper, we 
consider the case of acid rains control and CO2 emissions. Different options are available to 
reduce SO2 emissions. Some of these options, like switching from burning coal to burning 
natural gas would imply SO2 as well as CO2 emissions reductions.2 On the other hand, 
scrubbers installed in power plants to neutralize SO2 emissions use energy and therefore lead 
to more CO2 emissions.3 In the same way, switching from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coals can 
lower SO2 emissions. These low-sulfur coals have a lower heat value; so more coal must be 
burned to generate a given amount of output leading to higher CO2 emissions (see Barker et 
al. 1997).  
 
An international treaty foreseeing abatement of one of these air-pollutants, like SO2, may also 
have a significant ancillary impact on CO2, and, as a consequence, on the design of future 
international climate agreements. Indeed, these ancillary effects will alter the cost-benefit 
calculations underlying policy targets. The objective of this paper is twofold: (1) estimate the 
impact on CO2 emissions of international treaties that follow the 1979 LRTAP Convention 
and that address conventional air-pollutants such as SO2, NOx or VOC, and (2) derive some 
implications in terms of climate change policies 
 
Identifying the effect of an agreement raises two problems: (1) endogeneity of the treaty 
ratification variables resulting from omitted variables or reverse causality (i.e. countries' 
incentives to ratify agreements may depend on their emission levels) and (2) timing effects of 
the treaty (i.e. effects may start early or be bunched at a future date). As we analyze the effect 
of multiple treaties, the identification challenge becomes higher because they overlap in time 
and in terms of signatory countries. There may not be sufficient heterogeneity between them 
to identify their individual effects.  
 
We deal with the problem of endogeneity by instrumenting the decision to ratify an air-
pollution agreement using the status of the death penalty as a proxy for universalism or 
progressivism. We deal with timing effects and time and membership overlap issues together. 
Since agreements that follow the 1979 LRTAP Convention are relatively similar in terms of 
their timing and signatory countries, it is impossible to identify the effects of these 
agreements individually. To overcome these issues, we group LRTAP treaties into a single 
variable. The idea behind this assumption is that agreements related to the same air-pollution 
issue (i.e. here acid rains) are linked and should have a similar impact on CO2 emissions.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to estimate empirically the impact 
on CO2 emissions of various treaties not specifically targeted toward these emissions. 
Interestingly, LRTAP treaties are associated with statistically significant CO2 emissions 
reductions. Even if these reductions are non-negligible, they are not large enough to 
completely forego negotiations of an international climate agreement. However, the ancillary 
effect identified in this paper suggests that LRTAP treaties may have a role to play in the 
future climate policies. For example, these two pollution issues could be tackled together at 
the international level in order to take the ancillary benefits into account and potentially 
achieve extra CO2 emissions reductions. 
 
The approach used in this paper differs from the existing empirical literature on international 
environmental agreements (Murdoch and Sandler 1996; Bratbeg et al. 2005; Aakvik and 
Tjøtta 2011) by considering multiple non CO2-specific agreements at the same time, instead 
of focusing on a single one. It points out the limitations of studying the effects of each treaty 
in isolation. In line with this idea, Egger and Wamser (2012) challenge the existing literature 
on preferential agreements, which focuses on one policy area, by providing evidence of an 
important overlap in the conclusion of different types of preferential economic integration 
agreements.  
 
Some papers deal with potential interactions between air-pollution issues, but they are either 
purely theoretical models or numerical simulations, e.g. integrated cost-benefit analyses. 
Ambec and Coria (2013) demonstrate that the optimal policy instrument (e.g. taxes, tradable 
permits or a mix between the two) in the presence of two pollutants depends on whether there 
are economies or diseconomies of scope in the joint abatement cost function. Caplan and 
Silva (2005) consider multiple pollutants causing regional and global damages and 
characterized by abatement externalities (i.e. emissions abatement of one pollutant has an 
ancillary impact on the emissions of the other pollutant). They show that the use of a global 
permit market to control CO2 emissions that would be linked with regional permit market to 
control regional pollutants may lead to Pareto superior outcome. 
  
 Some papers using the numerical simulations (Burtraw et al. 2001; Driscoll et al. 2015) 
analyze a question that is the mirror of ours: they look at the impact of GHG mitigation 
policies on conventional air pollutants and air quality and find a positive relationship.  Bollen 
et al. (2009) study the link between climate change policies and policies designed to reduce 
local pollutants (e.g. particulate matters) and conclude that combining both policies achieves 
extra CO2 emissions reductions that are higher than what follows from the sum of the 
application of either policy alone. However, in their model, abatement of local pollutants does 
not generate ancillary CO2 emission reductions. Our paper thus provides an additional 
argument in favor of combining both policies. 
 
The structure of the paper is the following: Section II describes the data and the identification 
strategy. Section III reports the results for different specifications.  The results are then 
discussed in section IV. A sensitivity analysis is presented in section V. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
The aim of this paper is to study whether a country's participation in a non CO2-specific air-
pollution agreement has an impact on the level of CO2 emissions of that country. In this 
section, we first describe our emissions and air-pollution treaties data. We then turn to the 
identification issues raised by our question. 
 
Data 
We use a panel dataset that covers 150 countries and 38 years (1970-2008). Data on CO2 
emissions (in kilotons) come from the World Development Indicator (WDI) Dataset (World 
Bank, 2012).4 These data only include CO2 emissions from energy-related sources 
(approximately 70% of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions, see Stern 2006).5  
 
A single source of CO2 emissions is generally also responsible for other air-pollutants 
emissions. The typical examples are the so-called conventional air pollutants, e.g. SO2, NOx 
or VOC (see Barker 1993). To select the international agreements targeting air-pollutants 
released with CO2 emissions in most industrial processes, we refer to the International 
Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project (Version 2012.1). It provides for each 
country a list of the environmental agreements in which the country is involved, with the 
signature, ratification and entry into force dates, and when relevant the withdrawal date.6 In 
the IEA Database, the agreements of interest for this analysis belong to the Long-Range 
Transboundary Air-Pollution lineage, which consists of one initial convention, 8 protocols 
and 15 amendments and that are targeted to conventional air-pollutants, responsible for acid 
rains or degradations in ambient air quality.  
   
This lineage started with the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
which followed increasing concerns by policy-makers about the harmful effect of 
transboundary pollution caused by SO2 or NOx emissions that can travel some hundreds of 
kilometers before deposition. This initial Convention served as a basis for eight follow-up 
protocols and a series of amendments. In our analysis, we cannot include all these treaties 
because they are not all comparable. We only include those that satisfy the three following 
criteria: (1) the objective of the treaty is the reduction of emissions of some air-pollutant, (2) 
the treaty includes explicit quantified emission reduction targets, and (3) it should involve the 
country (i.e. it should not rely on the tacit acceptance procedure).7 
 
The 15 amendments rely on the tacit acceptance procedure and are thus deleted (these are 
mainly technical modifications of the original treaty). The initial 1979 LRTAP Convention is 
also dropped because it does not include explicit targets. It only provides for the 
establishment of institutions entitled to negotiate the subsequent protocols. For the same 
reason, the 1984 monitoring and evaluation protocol EMEP, which only requires that 
signatories report their emissions to the treaty secretariat, is also dropped. We are left with 
seven treaties related to air-pollution that include emissions reductions targets for ratifying 
countries. Details on these agreements can be found in Table 1.    
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
We will assume that an agreement's year of ratification in national parliaments is the point in 
time from which this agreement has an impact on emissions.  Ratification is preferred to 
signature because ratification involves political parties, the media, and the general public, 
while the signature of an agreement has no immediate political relevance. This choice is in 
line with other empirical analyses of international environmental agreements (e.g. Bratberg et 
al. 2005; Aichele and Felbermayr 2012): there exists some anecdotal evidence that countries 
have engaged in policy initiatives after the ratification of an agreement and before its entry 
into force. 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of tons of CO2 per capita emitted by each country as a function of 
the number of ratified LRTAP agreements by this country for the years 1985, 1995 and 2005. 
Among the 150 countries of the sample, there is a lot of heterogeneity in terms of ratification 
behavior. Some countries, like China, did not ratify any agreement during the sample period. 
The United States and the United Kingdom have ratified respectively 3 and 6 treaties in 2005. 
In general, European countries are the ones that have ratified the largest number of 
agreements. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
The gap in the number of ratifications between the United States and the United Kingdom has 
increased sharply since 1995. Figure 1 also shows that only the UK has reduced its emissions 
between 1985 and 2005 (i.e. the period during which LRTAP treaties have been ratified). This 
reduction is of about 9% over the period. Looking at the data, a similar pattern arises for other 
European countries. In the US, emissions first increase between 1985 and 1995 and then 
decrease by only 4% between 1995 and 2005.  China's emissions have increased sharply 
during this period, while the number of agreements ratified by this country remained at zero. 
From Figure 1, one might believe that it is because the UK and other European countries have 
ratified many treaties that they were able to reduce their emissions while China and the US 
still accounted for approximately 40% of total world emissions in 2008. 
Identification strategy  
The first insights from Figure 1 do not account for the fact that the changes in the emission 
behavior can be due to spuriousness: other variables can explain the emission behavior of the 
ratifiers. Additionally to confounding effects, we need to deal with four problems when 
identifying the effects of multiple agreements on CO2 emissions: (1) time and membership 
overlap (is there sufficient variation in terms of treaties' timing and signatory countries), (2) 
timing effects (the effect of an agreement does not necessarily occur immediately after its 
ratification) (3) persistence of CO2 emissions (due to the substantial inertia of some of CO2, it 
is plausible to assume that this year's CO2 emissions are dependent on the CO2 emissions of 
previous years), and (4) endogeneity of a treaty ratification. We detail below how we 
overcome these issues.  
 
Controlling for confounding effects 
Spuriousness can be checked for by making use of control variables. The following model 
examines how CO2 emissions react to the ratification of air-pollution agreements controlling 
for other variables: 
 log  (𝐶𝑂!)!" = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝛽𝑋!"!!! + 𝐙𝐢𝐭𝛄+ 𝜀!" [1] 
 
In equation (1), i denotes the country and t the year. Variables are defined as follows: log  (𝐶𝑂!)!" is the log of total CO2 emissions of country i in year t (in kilotons).8 𝛼! is the 
country fixed effect, 𝛿! is the time fixed effect. These fixed effects control for unobservable 
country-heterogeneity and common time-varying effects that could affect emissions (see 
Hsiao 1986). Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is needed to capture factors such as 
country specific technology, regulation or ideology or world business cycles. The variable of 
interest 𝑋!"!!!  is a dummy variable, where k is the reference number of the agreement in Table 
1, defined as:9 𝑋!"!!! = 1 if  country  𝑖  has  ratified  the  agreement  𝑘  by  time  𝑡 − 1  0 otherwise  
  
As treaties are not systematically ratified on the first of January of year t, we consider that a 
treaty ratified in t-1 will have an impact on CO2 emissions from year t. 𝛽 is the coefficient of 
interest. It represents the yearly average effect of the ratification of an agreement k by country 
i on this country's emissions compared to business-as-usual emissions after controlling for a 
set of covariates. This coefficient may be positive or negative depending on the options used 
to curb conventional air-pollutants (e.g. scrubbers or fuel-switching).  
 𝐙!" is the matrix containing the control variables. Summary statistics for these control 
variables are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. Data are available from the WDI 
Database (World Bank 2012) and the Polity IV Database. The first economic factor that we 
include as a control variable is total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP data are 
reported in constant 2000 US dollars. We expect a significant positive relationship between 
GDP and emissions. The intuition is simple: a higher economic activity induces, ceteris 
paribus, a higher level of pollution due to increased resource use and waste generation 
(Panayotou 1997; Stern 2002).10 We also include the GDP growth rate to account for the 
short-term variations in the economic activity (business cycles). Indeed, following van 
Vuuren and Riahi (2008), economic growth is expected to have both a positive effect on CO2 
emissions (due to the increase in energy demand) and a negative effect (due to the 
improvement in energy efficiency). 
 
Following the international trade literature (see for example, Copeland and Taylor 2004), 
trade openness is assumed to affect the level of CO2 emissions in two different ways: (i) 
increased trade may result in more CO2 emissions due to an enhanced economic activity, (ii) 
increased trade may result in reduced CO2 emission because countries face greater 
competitive pressure and become more efficient in resource use (Cole 2004). We define trade 
openness as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by GDP. 
 
Next, we control for the total population given that population size may contribute to CO2 
emissions through increased energy demand from the power, industry or transport sectors (Li 
and Reuveny 2006; Shi 2002). Since the composition of the economic activity may also 
influence the level of CO2 emissions (see Stern 2002), we include the shares of agricultural 
and industrial productions in GDP. Indeed, industrial and agricultural sectors are more 
resource-intensive than the tertiary sector. Following Neumayer (2002), who finds a positive 
relationship between the number of multilateral environmental agreements ratified by a 
country and the level of democracy in this country, we include a Democracy indicator 
available from the Polity IV Database. This indicator measures countries' institutionalized 
democracy. It is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10), zero being the worst situation for 
democracy.11 
 
Our last control is 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐸𝐴!", which counts the number of multilateral environmental 
agreements other than the LRTAP treaties that country i has ratified up to year t. Since the 
early 1990s, there has been a growing political concern about CO2 emissions and their impact 
on climate change (Barrett 2003). Some countries have been more proactive in dealing with 
this issue (i.e. they have been greener) and it is reasonable to assume that countries that have 
ratified LRTAP treaties are also greener than those that did not. Therefore, LRTAP treaties 
may in fact capture growing national CO2 emissions policies adopted in greener countries. In 
order to control for that, we include 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐸𝐴!" as a proxy for a country's environmental 
awareness (see Aichele and Felbermayr 2012).  
 
Time and membership overlap 
To correctly identify the effects of the seven LRTAP treaties included in the analysis, there 
must be sufficient heterogeneity in terms of the timing of the agreements and in terms of the 
ratifying countries. To check for this, we refer to Tables 1 and 2. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
First, as shown in Table 1, the number of ratifiers at the end of our sample period is roughly 
similar for all LRTAP agreements (i.e. it ranges from 19 to 29). Moreover, the identity of the 
ratifiers is also much the same across them. This can be seen from Table 2, which reports the 
correlations between the dummies 𝑋!! for the year 2008 (the last year of our sample, and thus 
the year for which the membership overlap is the highest). These correlations are very high 
(e.g. above 0.7 for most pairs of treaties), indicating a low heterogeneity in terms of 
membership between LRTAP protocols. Second, as shown in Table 1, treaties have been 
ratified since the end of the 1980s until 2005, but the time span between two agreements is 
relatively short (generally less than 5 years). 
 
 Due to this time and membership overlap, the treaty dummies 𝑋!"!!!  will be highly correlated 
through time and across countries and identifying accurately the effect of each individual 
agreement is problematic. We thus aggregate the agreements in a single variable. Our 
argument behind this strategy can be found in their patterns of development. Countries first 
agree on an umbrella convention, i.e. the 1979 LRTAP Convention under the auspices of 
which all subsequent protocols and amendments are negotiated. These protocols are thus 
related. We create a new variable, LRTAPit-1, which is the sum of dummies 𝑋!"!!!  (k=1... 7) for 
country i in year t-1, and we replace 𝑋!"!!!  by LRTAPit-1 in equation (1).  
 
With this definition, we will not be able to capture the impact of each individual treaty but we 
will look at the average effect of the accumulation of treaties. The estimated coefficient will 
be the average effect of an additional air-pollutant treaty on a country's level of CO2 




 To analyze the timing issue, we refer to Table 3, which reports the dates at which emission 
targets foreseen in agreements should be met and the year by which a treaty has been ratified 
by 50% of member countries. It is possible that the effect of an agreement does not occur 
immediately after its ratification, i.e. targets should not be met right after the ratification and 
implementing domestic air-pollution control policies may take time. To try to remedy this 
problem, we change the point in time from which a treaty has an impact on emissions by 
using alternative definitions of the LRTAP variable: (1) a treaty has an impact after it enters 
into force and (2) a treaty has an impact t years after its ratification (where t =1... 4).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The last timing issue concerns the Kyoto Protocol. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) show that 
domestic CO2 emissions in committed countries have been reduced by about 7% after the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, while the share of imported over domestic emissions in 
those committed countries has increased by about 14%. As our sample period covers the 
period during which the Kyoto Protocol has been adopted (1997) and ratified (mainly 2002), 
this may have an impact on our results. We discuss this issue in the sensitivity analysis. 
 
Persistence of CO2 emissions 
Equation (1) is in some sense static. Due to the substantial inertia of the dependent variable, it 
is plausible to assume that this year's CO2 emissions are dependent on the CO2 emissions of 
previous years. This is why we introduce a lagged dependent variable in our model: 
 
 log  (𝐶𝑂!)!" = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝜌 log 𝐶𝑂! !"!! + 𝛽𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑃!"!! + 𝐙𝐢𝐭𝛄+ 𝜀!" [2] 
 𝜌 is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The coefficients of the explanatory 
variables, 𝛽 and 𝛄, have different interpretations compared to the previous basic static 
specification. They are the estimated responses of CO2 emissions to changes in the 
explanatory variables, after controlling for the response for the previous years.  
 
Some econometric problems arise from estimating equation (2): CO2 may be non-stationary 
and the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. The coefficients of the 
regressors may thus be seriously biased when estimating equation (2) with OLS. Note 
however that this bias decreases when the number of periods becomes large. Taking the first 
difference transformation and using the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimator allow to avoid these 
problems:  
 
 Δlog  (𝐶𝑂!)!" = 𝛿! − 𝛿!!! + 𝜌Δ log 𝐶𝑂! !"!! + 𝛽Δ𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑃!"!! + 𝚫𝐙𝐢𝐭𝛄+ Δ𝜀!" [3] 
 Where Δlog  (𝐶𝑂!)!" is instrumented using lags 2 to 4 of log  (𝐶𝑂!)!". 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that the AH estimator, while consistent, fails to exploit all 
the information available in the sample. For this reason, we also estimate equation (3) using 
the Arellano-Bond estimator.  
 
Dealing with endogeneity 
CO2 emissions may depend on many other factors that are not included in our control 
variables. As some of these omitted variables may drive both CO2 emissions and the decision 
to ratify a LRTAP treaty, our results may be biased. By using a two-way fixed effects model, 
we control for unobservable country-heterogeneity and common time varying effects, but 
some omitted variables may vary across countries and over time (e.g. a country's level of 
concern about environmental issues or the amount of foreign direct investments in that 
country). For example, foreign direct investments will have an impact on a country's level of 
CO2 emissions. At the same time, the Pollution haven hypothesis predicts that, as FDI provide 
economic benefits to the host country, this country may be reluctant to ratify additional air-
pollution agreements, which would impose stricter environmental regulations and would drive 
these FDI out of the country.12 
 
Furthermore, even if LRTAP treaties are not targeted towards CO2 emissions, there may also 
exist a reverse causality problem between these two variables. Air pollutants covered by 
LRTAP treaties are very often emitted together with CO2 emissions, which implies that large 
CO2 emitters can also emit large amounts of conventional air-pollutants.  These large emitters 
would incur the greatest cost of reducing emissions. As air-pollutants can travel some 
hundreds kilometers before deposition, these countries do not necessarily enjoy the entire 
environmental benefits of their actions and may be reluctant to ratify LRTAP treaties. 
 
To deal with these problems, we use an Instrumental Variable approach. Our instrument is an 
index measuring the status of the death penalty. It is constructed as follows:13 we measure the 
status of the death penalty on a five-point scale (0-4), from constitutional authorization of the 
death penalty (0) to abolition of the death penalty for any offense in both peace and war 
periods (4) (see Table 4 for details on scores). 
 
We argue that this is a valid instrument for the four following reasons that will be detailed 
below: (1) it is a relevant instrument to measure the propensity of a country to ratify air-
pollution agreements, (2) the status of the death penalty does not affect the level of CO2 
emissions, (3) the level of CO2 emissions does not influence the countries' decisions about the 
death penalty, and (4) the index varies sufficiently over time and across countries. 
 
First, the pace at which a country ratifies international environmental agreements may be 
explained by its universalism, i.e. the meta-ethical conviction that some system of ethics 
applies universally (e.g. for every individual, independently of their culture, religion, 
nationality, sexuality...). Indeed, a country that is strongly universalist will be keener to ratify 
international agreements related to public goods because these treaties are ways to apply this 
system of ethics universally. Our idea is to use universalism as an instrument for treaties' 
ratification that is not directly related to CO2 emissions. We believe that the pace at which the 
death penalty is abolished, but also the legalization of homosexual marriage or euthanasia, can 
be seen as symbols, and therefore as proxies, for progressive or universalist societies.  
 
Second, this instrument does not affect the level of CO2 emissions directly and it is obviously 
not caused by the level of CO2 emissions. However, there may be a concern that the abolition 
of the death penalty might be driven by economic development, which in turn correlates with 
CO2 emissions. We believe this should not be a major concern. On the one hand, we control 
for economic development in our analysis through our control variable GDP. On the other 
hand, there is some anecdotal evidence that this is not always the case: the United States and 
Japan, which are already very developed countries (they are amongst the countries with the 
highest GDP per capita levels in our database) both still constitutionally authorize the death 
penalty, while the Ivory Coast or Honduras, which are at an early stage of development have 
de facto abolished the death penalty since the 1960s.14 
 
On a more rigorous level, Neumayer (2008) estimates that the most important determinants of 
abolition are political and that economic development does not matter for domestic death 
penalty abolition (see also Greenberg and West 2008). Note that we will test for the strength 
of our instrument in the Results Section. These tests will confirm us in our choice of the death 
penalty as an instrument. 
 
Finally, to be a good instrument in the context of panel data, there must be sufficient 
heterogeneity among countries regarding the abolition of the death penalty and the index must 
also vary over time.15 As shown in Table 5, in nearly 70 % of countries, the status of the death 
penalty has changed at least once between 1970 and 2008. The status of the death penalty also 
varies across countries (see Table 4). Moreover, the average death penalty index seems to 
vary significantly over time, as shown by Figure 2.16 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
III. RESULTS 
 Individual agreements 
As an illustration, we first estimate equation (1) for each individual agreement k (k=1... 7) in 
Table 1.17 We only present the results for the variables of interest 𝑋!"!!!  in Figure 3.18 It 
appears that all the LRTAP treaties have a significant negative impact on CO2 emissions. 
Furthermore, their effects are relatively similar.  However, as mentioned above, due to the 
substantial overlap in terms of membership and timing, the impact of each individual treaty 
will not be estimated accurately. This is why in the next section we turn to models in which 
agreements are grouped into one variable that counts the number of agreements ratified by 
each country, LRTAP.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
 
Accumulation of treaties 
Table 6 presents the results for the LRTAP variable of the various specifications (equations 
(1)-(3)) detailed above. Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using a standard panel two-way 
fixed effects estimator. To control for heteroskedasticity and within country serial correlation, 
standard errors are estimated using the Huber-White sandwich estimator, clustered at the 
country level. Results are shown in the first two columns. The last three columns refer to 
equation (3). In these last three columns, standard errors are also clustered at the country 
level. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
  
In column 1 of Table 6 (static specification), the ratification by one country of each additional 
LRTAP agreement is associated with a reduction by approximately 4% of its CO2 emissions. 
When we turn to a dynamic model, results in column 2 suggest a strong inertia in CO2 
emissions since the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 𝜌 = 0.793.  The 
effect of LRTAP agreements is still negative and statistically significant. Note that this is a 
short-term effect, i.e. the effect after controlling for the response of the previous years.  
 
As noted in the previous section, some econometric problems arise from estimating equation 
(2): CO2 emissions may be non-stationary and the lagged dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term.  We run some panel unit root tests. Results are shown in Table 7. For all 
the tests, we reject the null hypothesis of the existence of unit roots in all panels. Our initial 
dynamic fixed-effect model would thus be fine as the bias of the autoregressive term would be 
negligible given the relative long time span of the data. However, when we run country-
specific panel unit root tests, we find that about 21% of panels contain a unit root.19 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
For this reason, we turn to the model in first difference, i.e. equation (3), estimated using the 
AH estimator (columns 3 and 4) and the AB estimator (column 5). In column 3, we only 
instrument the lagged dependent variable in first difference (Δlog  (𝐶𝑂!)!") using lags 2 to 4 in 
level. In column 4, we deal with the problem of endogeneity by assuming that treaties' 
ratification may be endogenous and by instrumenting the differenced LRTAP variable 
(Δ𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑃!"!!) with the death penalty index in level. In columns 3 to 5 of Table 6, the 
coefficient of LRTAP remains negative and significantly different from zero. The value 
obtained with the AH estimator when treaties' ratification is also instrumented (column 4), 
seems too high: each additional treaty ratified by one country reduces the CO2 emissions in 
that country by approximately 9%. As mentioned earlier, the AH estimator fails to exploit all 
the information available in the sample and the coefficient of interest may be very imprecisely 
estimated in column 4. The AB estimator in column 5 provides a more efficient estimator than 
AH and we will consider it as our final result.  
 
The effect of LRTAP is negative and significant at the level of 5%: on average, ratification of 
an additional treaty has a short-term impact of 2.4% on CO2 emissions, i.e. after controlling 
for the response of previous years. Obviously, the estimated coefficients in the dynamic and 
static models are not directly comparable. However, in the dynamic specification, the 
cumulative effect of an agreement on CO2 emissions can be computed as 𝛽/(1− 𝜌), where 𝛽 = −0.024 is the short-term coefficient and 𝜌 = 0.706 is the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable. With our estimates, this cumulative effect is thus equal to approximately 
8.2% for LRTAP treaties, suggesting that the effect estimated with the static specification 
(4%) was probably underestimated. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there do not exist tests of the strength of instruments in AB 
models. We rely on the results of the first-stage AH estimator as is generally done in the 
literature. To test for the validity of our instruments, we first look at the first-stage equations 
of the model in column 4, which are given by: 
  Δ𝑦!"!!! = 𝛿! − 𝛿!!! + 𝜓!!𝐷𝑃!"!! + 𝜓!! log 𝐶𝑂! !"!! + 𝜓!! log 𝐶𝑂! !"!!+ 𝜓!! log 𝐶𝑂! !"!! + 𝚫𝐙𝐢𝐭𝛉𝐣 + Δ𝑢!" [4] 
For j = 1,2. 
 Where 𝑦!"!!! = 𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑃!"!!, 𝑦!"!!! = log  (𝐶𝑂!)!"!! and 𝐷𝑃!"!! is the death penalty index.20 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
Column 1 in Table 8 shows the results for Δlog  (𝐶𝑂!)!"!! and column 2 for Δ𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑃!"!!. 
Death penalty seems to be a good determinant of the ratification of LRTAP agreements.21 The 
strength of the instruments (the lagged dependent variable in level and the status of the death 
penalty) is further checked with tests presented in Table 9. Instruments are quite strong. 
Indeed, we are sure at 95% that the maximal bias associated with the coefficient of interest is 
less than 10% of the OLS bias (weak identification test).22 From the under-identification test, 
we can conclude that the first-stage equation is identified, i.e. the excluded instruments (Death 
Penalty and lags 2 and 4 of log  (𝐶𝑂!)) are relevant (correlated with the endogenous 
regressor).23 
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
We also present the Arellano-Bond tests for AR(1) and AR(2) (See Table 10), for which the 
null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation in the error term. AR(1) is expected in first 
differences, because the differenced error terms in t and t-1 both contain the 𝜀!" term. To 
check if our instruments in levels are good instruments for the first-difference, we need to 
look at AR(2). Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other 
variables used as instruments) are in fact endogenous, thus bad instruments.  As shown in 
Table 10, we cannot reject that our instruments in level are valid instrument.24   
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
Finally, for the other results, most of the control variables have the expected sign. A higher 
GDP level is associated with higher CO2 emissions. The coefficients of trade openness and 
population are positive but not significant. Both the shares of agricultural and industrial 
productions imply an increase of CO2 emissions, but they do not have a significant impact. 
Democracy has a positive effect on CO2 emissions (but only significant at the 10% level). The 
GDP growth rate coefficient has a negative sign in the static specification of column 1, but a 
positive sign in the dynamic specifications (indicating increases in energy consumption that 
seem to offset energy efficiency improvements during periods of economic growth).25 
  
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
The record of recent climate negotiations (e.g. Cancun, Copenhagen...) demonstrates that an 
ambitious climate change agreement is very difficult to achieve. By contrast, pollutants 
covered by LRTAP agreements (SO2, NOx or VOC) are local pollutants with larger and more 
visible short-term health benefits (Burtraw et al. 2001) than the long-term benefits obtainable 
through climate change measures (e.g. due to more substantial discounting). Treaties on these 
types of pollutants will thus be easier to reach and lead to a higher commitment by politicians. 
However, this does not imply that policy-makers should concentrate only on these local 
pollutants and completely forego achieving self-enforcing international agreements on CO2 
emissions. 
 
Our results show that, even if they are not directly targeted towards CO2 emissions, each 
additional LRTAP treaty is associated with an annual reduction of CO2 emissions of 
approximately 2.4% and this effect accumulates overtime (i.e. 8.2% in the long-term). How 
can we interpret this estimate in terms of the future CO2 emission reductions that some 
countries want to implement? 
 
In advance of the Conference of the Parties in Paris (COP 21), some countries have submitted 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) containing, implicitly or explicitly, 
emission reduction commitments. For example, the United States have pledged to cut net 
greenhouse-gas emissions by 26% to 28% (relative to 2005 levels) by 2025, while the 
European Union has pledged to cut GHG emissions by at least 40% (relative to 1990 levels) 
by 2030 (IEA, 2015). Relative to 2008 levels (last year of our sample), these objectives 
correspond to a reduction in emissions of 24% by 2025 for the US and 36.5% by 2030 for the 
EU.  
 
In order to evaluate the impact of the LRTAP treaties, we can compute what would have been 
the emissions in the absence of these agreements (assuming a yearly reduction of 2.4% which 
accumulates over time), for each country and each year of our sample. Emissions in the US 
would have been 21% higher in 2008, while emissions from the 27 countries member of the 
EU in 2008 would have been 41% higher. If the US and EU countries wanted to reach the 
same levels of emissions as those proposed in the current INDC,26 considerably more effort 
would have been required: a reduction of 40.6% relative to 2008 level for the US and 63% for 
the EU. Given our estimates, the impact of LRTAP treaties on current CO2 emissions is thus 
non-negligible. 
 
Another way to interpret our results is in terms of the remaining carbon budget. According to 
a recent report released by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2015), with the INDC 
submitted for the COP21, the world's estimated remaining carbon budget consistent with a 
50% chance of keeping the rise in temperature below 2 degrees Celsius will be consumed by 
around 2040. If we assume that a new LRTAP agreement is ratified by all countries in 2015, 
then in 2040, the world will have saved at least 7.4% of its carbon budget.27 
 
In view of these examples, the impact of LRTAP treaties on CO2 emissions is non-negligible 
but clearly not large enough to rely only on these policies to solve the climate change issue. 
An international self-enforcing agreement with CO2 emission reduction targets will still be 
necessary. Nevertheless, the abatement complementarity between CO2 emissions and 
conventional air-pollutants identified in this paper may have some implications regarding the 
design of the future climate change policies. Namely, it provides an empirical argument to 
jointly negotiate on regional and global pollution issues at the next COP. This could be 
particularly relevant for developing countries with sizeable CO2 emissions, the participation 
of which is essential to reaching an efficient climate agreement. If these countries also suffer 
domestically from bad air quality, the incentive to control conventional air-pollutants will be 
strong. For example, adopting acid rain control measures could lead to substantial ancillary 
benefits in terms of CO2 emissions, which may help these countries reach CO2 targets more 
easily.   
 
 An example of how to implement this combination of policies has been proposed by Caplan 
and Silva (2005). They theoretically show how a global permit market can be linked with 
regional permit markets to control local pollutants and how this may lead to a Pareto superior 
outcome that is self-enforcing. In their model, there are abatement complementarities between 
the local and global pollutants and, with an international joint permit market; the emissions 
caps on both pollutants in each region will take into account these complementarities. 
  
V. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we test the robustness of our benchmark results, i.e. that the ratification of each 
additional air-pollution treaty is associated with a significant reduction of CO2 emissions. All 
the results in this section are obtained by estimating equation (3) using the AB estimator. 




 As our main result may be sensitive to the choice of the point in time from which a treaty has 
an impact on emissions, we have re-estimated the model using alternative definitions of the 
variable of interest. Results are not reported in full but available upon request (see Tables B1 
and B2 in Appendix B). We first consider that the effects of a treaty do not occur 
immediately, but only k years after its ratification (for k=2,3,4): the new variable of interest is 𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑃!"!!. Second, we use entry into force rather than ratification as the point in time from 
which a treaty has an impact on CO2 emissions. The results are similar compared to those in 
column 5 of Table 6: the short-term impact of LRTAP agreements is still negative and 
significant.29   
 
Including other agreements  
We also test whether our result is really driven by treaty ratifications or whether only the 
participation to the LRTAP Convention matters (see Table B3 in Appendix B):30 we substitute 
the variable LRTAPit by a dummy variable Conventionit, which is equal to 1 if country i has 
ratified the Convention by time t. The impact of the Convention is negative but not 
significant.  
 
Initially, we excluded from our analysis the 1984 EMEP treaty because it only required that 
countries report their emissions to the treaty secretariat. However, one might suggest that 
transparency (achieved through emissions reporting) is a key factor to achieve explicit 
reduction targets. We therefore modify the variable LRTAPit by including ratification of the 
1984 EMEP treaty. The impact remains significant and is a little bit higher than our main 
result (-0.026 instead of -0.024). This could suggest that the simple obligation of reporting has 
contributed to emission reductions achieved by the LRTAP treaties.  
 
Effect of the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol has been ratified during the period analyzed in this paper (most 
ratifications occurred in 2002).31 As a consequence, some CO2 emission reductions at the end 
of our sample period may potentially be due to the Kyoto Protocol. To control for this, we 
estimate our model for two different sample periods: (1) before the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol (1970-1997) and (2) before its ratification (1970-2002). Results (not reported in full) 
are similar (and even stronger) compared to those in column 5 of Table 6  (see Table B4 in 
Appendix B).  
 
Other set of controls 
 Environmental agreements might affect the level of imports/exports (our measure of trade 
openness) and, as it is included as control variables, our results may be biased. Moreover, the 
coefficients of some of our control variables (e.g. proportion of agriculture in GDP, growth 
rate or logMEA) are not significant. As shown in Table B5 (Appendix B), omitting these 
control variables does not change the main results (the size and the significativity of the 
results are even higher). Other control variables (e.g. the amount of foreign direct investments 
or the proportion of electricity production from natural gas sources, which is less sulfur and 
carbon intensive than coal for example) were also introduced in the AB specification, but this 
did not change the main results of the model (see columns 3 and 4 of Table B5). Other 
variables would have been interesting to study, such as the legal origin (see Stern 2012). 
However, these variables do not vary over time and are likely to be captured by the fixed 
effects or to disappear when we turn to the AH or AB estimations.  
 
Sub-samples of countries 
We test whether our benchmark results are not driven by a particular sub-sample of countries. 
The thrust of our argument continues to hold (see Table B6 in Appendix B). Air-pollution 
agreements have a negative impact on CO2 emissions, whatever the sub-sample considered: 
(1) without the biggest SO2 emitters (United States, United Kingdom, Poland, Spain and 
Germany), (2) without the countries that were the most affected by acid rains before the 
ratification of the LRTAP agreements (Scandinavian countries),32 and (3) without economies 
in transition.33 
 
Net CO2 emissions  
Our data on CO2 emissions do not take into account emissions/removals from land use, land 
use change and forestry (LULUCF). The data used in this paper are thus gross CO2 emissions. 
However, there are examples of countries, such as Russia, that have reduced their gross CO2 
emissions and at the same time have destroyed substantial parts of their forest area, thereby 
increasing their net CO2 emissions. In this case, emission reductions are over-estimated since 
the destruction of forests, which are carbon sinks, increases the stock of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. In order to get an idea of the effect of air-pollution agreements on net CO2 
emissions, we remove from our sample countries with the highest deforestation rates 
(information comes from http://www.grida.no). In other countries, the gross CO2 emissions 
(our data) should be very similar to net emissions and the coefficient of the variable of interest 
for those countries should thus not be affected by the fact that we do not take into account 
removals from LULUCF. The results in Table B6 (Appendix B) show that the effect is similar 
but a little bit smaller (-0.02 rather than -0.024) when we remove countries with the highest 
deforestation rates.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper is to test for the effectivity of air-pollution agreements on the level 
of CO2 emissions. There is strong evidence that CO2 (a global pollutant) is often released with 
more conventional air-pollutants. Pollution abatements imposed by international treaties 
targeted to these conventional pollutants may thus jointly reduce the flows of both types of 
pollutants. Our analysis focuses on the effects of the treaties that follow the 1979 LRTAP 
Convention. 
 
We deal with different issues pertaining to the identification of the effect of these multiple 
agreements: (1) endogeneity, (2) timing effects and (3) time and membership overlap between 
treaties. The main result is that LRTAP agreements, even if they are not CO2-specific, have a 
statistically significant negative impact on CO2 emissions. This puts forward the limitation of 
studying the effects of an environmental agreement in isolation. This also suggests that these 
two pollution issues could be tackled together at the international level in order to take these 
ancillary benefits into account in future policy targets. 
 
This paper is a first attempt to study the ancillary effects of multiple air-pollution treaties 
empirically. We identify potential ancillary benefits of LRTAP treaties for climate change 
issues. However, climate change is a very complex problem and this study can be extended in 
several ways. Among others, LRTAP treaties are also expected to have an impact on SO2 
emissions, which are turned into sulphate aerosols. They have only a short lifetime in the 
atmosphere, but have a substantial cooling effect and can thus postpone the impact of climate 
change (see Tol 2004). SO2 reductions due to LRTAP treaties may thus partially offset carbon 
emission reductions by those treaties. This example shows that in order to design an optimal 
international climate policy, it is crucial to understand and estimate all the interactions 





[INSERT TABLE A1 HERE] 
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Tables 
TABLE 1  
International Environmental Agreements related to air-pollution  (Mitchell, 2002-2012) 
Ref. Agreement Title  and 




Starting year 2008 
1 Protocol On The Reduction 
Of Sulphur Emissions Or 
Their Transboundary Fluxes 
By At Least 30 Per Cent 
(Helsinki, 1985) 
 
1985 1 21 
2 Protocol Concerning The 
Control Of Emissions of 
Nitrogen Oxides Or Their 
Transboundary Fluxes (Sofia, 
1988) 
 
1988 8 29 
3 Protocol Concerning The 
Control Of Emissions Of 
Volatile Organic Compounds 
Or Their Transboundary 
Fluxes (Geneva, 1991) 
 
1993 3 19 
4 Protocol On Further 
Reduction Of Sulphur 
Emissions (Oslo, 1994) 
 
1995 3 23 
5 Protocol On Heavy Metals To 
The Convention On Long- 
Range Transboundary air-
pollution (Aarhus, 1998) 
 
1998 1 24 
6 Protocol On Persistent 
Organic Pollutants To The 




1998 1 23 
7 Protocol To Abate 
Acidification, Eutrophication 
And Ground-Level 
Ozone To The Convention 
On LRTAP (Gothenburg, 
1999) 
2002 3 22 
a Members  are countries that ratify one particular treaty, either in the starting year (column 3) 
or in 2008. 
 
TABLE 2 
Correlation matrix for the year 2008 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1       
2 0.8242 1      
3 0.7706 0.7779 1     
4 0.6815 0.8693 0.8393 1    
5 0.6624 0.7533 0.7633 0.7732 1   
6 0.6815 0.7287 0.7836 0.7946 0.9246 1  
7 0.5387 0.7037 0.7486 0.7650 0.8471 0.7650 1 
















Targets of LRTAP treaties 
 
Treaty When must targets be achieved? Median Ratification 
Yeara 
1985 Helsinki Reductions should be met before 1993 
 
1986 




1991 Geneva Cap should be met by 1999 
 
1995 
1994 Oslo Cap on 2000 emissions 
 
1998 
1998 Aarhus Reductions should be implemented no 



























Number of countries for each value of the Death Penalty Index 
Index Definition 1970 1990 2008 
0 Death penalty still used 111 72 40 
1 Death penalty abolished de facto for ordinary crimes 0 0 0 
2 Death penalty abolished de facto for all crimes 
(Ordinary and war crimes) 
20 33 31 
3 Death penalty abolished for ordinary crimes 10 13 9 
4 Death penalty abolished for all crimes 9 32 70 
Note: de facto means that a country still has the death penalty in its Constitution but has not 




Number of changes in the death penalty index by country between 1970 and 2008 
 





 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
TABLE 6 
Estimating the effect of an agreement’s ratification on CO2  emissions 










log(CO2)  (t-1)  0.793*** 0.766*** 0.693*** 0.706*** 
  (0.016) (0.127) (0.141) (0.041) 
LRTAP  (t-1) -0.043*** -0.011*** -0.011** -0.090** -0.024** 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.046) (0.009) 
log(MEA)  (t) -0.049 -0.017 0.047 0.032 0.012 
 (0.058) (0.013) (0.040) (0.040) (0.035) 
log(GDP)  (t) 0.954*** 0.195*** 0.136 0.184* 0.258*** 
 (0.104) (0.029) (0.096) (0.105) (0.042) 
log(Population) (t) 0.530*** 0.033 0.098 -0.070 0.070 
 (0.191) (0.045) (0.181) (0.208) (0.126) 
log(Openness)  (t) 0.026 0.023* -0.004 -0.008 0.038 
 (0.055) (0.014) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
GDP Growth Rate  (t) -0.668*** 0.315*** 0.378*** 0.318** 0.114 
 (0.165) (0.082) (0.128) (0.137) (0.102) 
log(Prop.  Agriculture) (t) 0.113 0.038** -0.037 -0.039 0.002 
 (0.085) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038) 
log(Prop.  Industry) (t) 0.317*** 0.086*** 0.028 0.034 0.066 
 (0.090) (0.022) (0.068) (0.063) (0.050) 
Democracy  (t) 0.007 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.006* 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 4,275 4,253 4,059 4,059 4,109 
Number of countries 150 150 149 149 150 
Within R-squared 0.664 0.817 0.886 0.886 0.898 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared = squared correlation between the 







Fisher-type unit-root tests for log(CO2) based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
 
Tests Statistic p-value 
Inverse Chi-squared(300) P 483.884 0.000 
Inverse normal Z -3.207 0.001 
Inverse logit (749) L* -4.227 0.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 7.507 0.000 
Note: Number of panels: 150; Average number of periods:  36.02; H0: all panels contain unit 
roots; Ha: at least one panel is stationary. 
 
 
TABLE 8  
First-stage results 
 
 Endogenous regressors 
Instruments ∆log(C O2)t−1 ∆LRT APt−1 
Death Penalty  (t-1) 0.000 0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
log(CO2) (t-2) -0.085** -0.002 
 (0.037) (0.007) 
log(CO2) (t-3) 0.056 -0.004 
 (0.034) (0.010) 
log(CO2) (t-4) 0.024 0.010 
 (0.035) (0.007) 
Other Covariates YES YES 
F(4, 148) 8.43 (0.00) 8.78 (0.00) 












Note: Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (at 5%) for single endogenous regressor:  9.08 
(10% maximal IV relative bias). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates for the other covariates are not included in the Table, but they are 
available upon request. 
 
TABLE 9 
IV Statistics (AH estimation with LRTAP endogenous) 
Under-identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 25.334 
 Chi-sq. (3) p-value 0.000 
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 9.983 
Critical  value at 5%a 10% maximal IV relative bias 7.56 




Autocorrelation tests for AB estimation 
Test Stat. p-value 
AB test for AR(1) in first differences z = - 4.51 0.000 




Descriptive statistics for the control variables 
 	   Obs.	   Mean	   Std.  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
log(GDP)	   6800	   22.925	   2.380	   16.148	   30.088	  
log(Population)	   8444	   14.941	   2.336	   8.636	   21.015	  
log(Openness)	   6283	   4.211	   0.653	   -1.707	   6.100	  
GDP Growth Rate	   6710	   0.034	   0.062	   -0.714	   0.724	  
log(Prop. Agriculture)	   5788	   2.429	   1.149	   -3.314	   4.543	  
log(Prop. Industry)	   5822	   3.310	   0.444	   0.632	   4.561	  
Democracy	   5648	   4.268	   4.176	   0	   10	  
log(MEA)	   7800	   2.13	   1.56	   0	   5.22	  
 
TABLE B1 
Sensitivity  of the results:  Effect of ratification  in year t − k on emissions in year t 
 (Dependent Variable: log(CO2)) k = 1a k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 
log(CO2 ) (t-1) 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.707*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
LRTAP  (t-k) -0.024** -0.021** -0.018** -0.020** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of other covariates are not reported but 
are available upon request. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 




Sensitivity of the results: Entry into force 
 (Dependent Variable: log(CO2)) k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 
log(CO2 ) (t-1) 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.706*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Entry (t-k) -0.023** -0.020** -0.021** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of other covariates are not reported but 






Sensitivity of the results: LRTAP Convention and EMEP 
(Dependent Variable: log(CO2)) Convention EMEP 
log(CO2 ) (t-1) 0.704*** 0.706*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Convention  (t-1) -0.057  
 (0.038)  
New LRTAP(t-1)	   	   -0.026***	  	   	   (0.010)	  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of other covariates are not reported but 
are available upon request. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE B4 
Sensitivity of the results: Kyoto Protocol. 
 
(Dependent Variable: log(CO2)) 1970 - 1997 1970-2002 
log(CO2 ) (t-1)     0.642*** 0.682*** 
   (0.065) (0.050) 
LRTAP  (t-1) -0.085** -0.051** 
 (0.040) (0.021) 
Observations 2,488 3,161 
Number of countries 143 143 
Within R-squared 0.809 0.853 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of other covariates are not reported but 









Sensitivity of the results: other controls 
 
(Dependent Variable: log(CO2)) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(CO2)  (t-1) 0.702*** 0.710*** 0.705*** 0.684*** 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.056) (0.045) 
LRTAP  (t-1) -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.024*** -0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.046) 
log(MEA) (t) 0.018    
 (0.034)    
log(GDP)  (t) 0.286*** 0.328*** 0.273*** 0.359*** 
 (0.055) (0.061) (0.061) (0.073) 
log(Population) (t) 0.029 -0.050 0.026 -0.118 
 (0.104) (0.087) (0.101) (0.081) 
log(Openness)  (t) 0.043    
 (0.029)    
log(Prop. Industry) (t) 0.071* 0.114*** 0.144*** 0.116*** 
 (0.043) (0.032) (0.041) (0.035) 
Democracy 0.005* 0.006* 0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Prop. Gas (t)   -0.001  
   (0.001)  
log(FDI)  (t)    -0.000 
    (0.001) 
Observations 4,168 4,195 3,262 3,782 
Number of countries 150 150 121 150 
Within R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.899 0.879 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared = squared correlation between the 






Sensitivity of the results: sub-samples of countries. 
 
(Dependent Variable: log(CO2)) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(CO2) (t-1) 0.708*** 0.706*** 0.700*** 0.702*** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) 
LRTAP  (t-1) -0.022** -0.033** -0.026*** -0.020** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) 
log(MEA) (t) 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.006 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.036) 
log(GDP)  (t) 0.262*** 0.256*** 0.275*** 0.258*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.049) (0.046) 
log(Population) (t) 0.051 0.031 0.047 0.074 
 (0.126) (0.128) (0.128) (0.130) 
log(Openness) (t) 0.039 0.042 0.037 0.023 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.028) 
GDP Growth Rate  (t) 0.108 0.114 0.117 0.119 
 (0.104) (0.102) (0.109) (0.107) 
log(Prop. Agriculture)  (t) 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
log(Prop. Industry) (t) 0.072 0.062 0.067 0.065 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) 
Democracy 0.006** 0.006* 0.006* 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 3,966 3,917 3,822 3,455 
Number of countries 145 145 129 129 
Within R-squared 0.898 0.898 0.900 0.889 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared = squared correlation between the 
observed and predicted level of the dependent variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) = 
without biggest emitters; (2) = without most affected countries; (3) = no Economies in 




Figure 1: CO2  emissions (in tons per capita) and number of LRTAP treaties ratified in 1985, 
1995 and 2005 
Figure 2: Evolution of the world average death penalty index (1970-2010) 
Figure 3:  Effect of each individual agreement: Individual agreements’ coefficients and 95% 
confidence intervals (i.e. from estimating equation (1) for each agreement) 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This pattern is also true in other countries (see OECD 1991, p. 36).	  
2	  According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA 1999), the amounts of CO2 
produced for each billion Btu of heat energy extracted are: 208,000 pounds for coal, 164,000 
pounds for petroleum products, and 117,000 pounds for natural gas.	  
3	  Rubin and Nguyen (2015) estimate that a scrubber total energy requirement varies between 
2.5% and 6.1% of a gross power plant output (using coal as the main input).	  
4	  http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.	  
5	  Note that those data do not take into account CO2 emissions/removals from land use, land 
use change and forestry, LULUCF (IEA 2010). We will try to control for this in the 
sensitivity analysis in Section V.	  
6	  A treaty is defined as  “an intergovernmental document intended as legally binding with a 
primary stated purpose of preventing or managing human impacts on natural resources”.  A 
description of the database is given in Mitchell (2003).	  
7	  This procedure is used to adopt urgently needed amendments to international environmental 
agreements. The body that adopts this amendment at the same time fixes a specific time 
within which the parties will have to opportunity to notify either their acceptance or rejection 
or to remain silent. In case of silence the amendment is considered as accepted by the party.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Due to our log specification, the coefficients would have remained unchanged by taking 
CO2 emissions per capita instead of total CO2 emissions as the dependent variable. The only 
exception would have been the coefficient of the control variable Population.	  
9	  By using a within analysis rather than a between analysis, we may underestimate the effect 
of treaties on CO2 emissions. We also run a pooled regression (using some additional control 
variables) and find stronger results. However, since time invariant omitted variables that may 
affect the level of CO2 emissions can be numerous, we prefer to concentrate on within 
variations in the rest of the paper.	  
10	  The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesizes an inverse-U shaped relationship 
between a country's per capita income and its level of environmental quality (Galeotti et al. 
2006; Friedl and Getzner 2003). We test the EKC hypothesis by assuming a quadratic 
functional form for GDP in our specification but the main results remain unchanged.	  
11	  The Polity IV dataset contains coded annual information on regime and authority 
characteristics for independent states with more than 500,000 people in 2014. It covers the 
period 1800-2014. See Marshall et al. (2011) for a more detailed description of the dataset.	  
12	  Note that we have already addressed the issue of environmental awareness by including a 
proxy of that variable, i.e. logMEA. However, logMEA is not a perfect measure of 
environmental awareness and there may exist other proxies. We also try to include additional 
control variables (e.g. foreign direct investments) in the sensitivity analysis.	  
13	  Amnesty International provides up-to-date information as to the status of the death penalty 
for 197 countries.	  
14	  We also check that the correlation coefficient between GDP and our index of death penalty 
is very low (e.g. 0.17).	  
15	  Due to the lack of variations through time and across countries, we were not able to use 
legalization of homosexual marriage or euthanasia as instruments.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  We also reject the null hypothesis of no variation through time within a country as the F-
statistic is F(38,5662) = 88.69 (with a p-value of 0.00).	  
17	  All the results in this section are obtained using Stata 13.	  
18	  Results for the control variables are very similar to those of models analyzed in the next 
section.	  
19	  Results are not reported here but are available upon request.	  
20	  We also recode the death penalty variable and generate a set of 4 dummy variables that we 
use as instruments. Results do not change.	  
21	  Note that this result cannot be explained by an eventual common positive trend (i.e. the fact 
that both LRTAP and DP increase monotonically) as we use the status of the death penalty in 
level to instrument LRTAP in first-difference.	  
22	  Even if the Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistics is much higher than the Kleibergen-Paap rank 
Wald F statistic, the use of the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is more appropriate. It generalizes the 
Cragg-Donald statistic to the case of non-i.i.d. errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation and/or cluster robust statistics.	  
23	  However, lags 3 and 4 of log  (𝐶𝑂!) are not statistically significant in the first-stage 
equation.	  
24	  A potential weakness of the AB estimator (and thus also AH estimator) is that the lagged 
levels may be rather poor instruments for first differenced variables. This is especially the 
case if the dependent variable is close to a unit root, which seems not to be the case here since 𝜌 = 0.706 (see column 5). In the presence of poor instruments in level, one could use the 
augmented version – system GMM. The system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond) uses 
the level equation (e.g. equation (2) in our case). The variables in levels in the second 
equation are instrumented with their own first differences. However, using this method in a 
panel with fixed effects requires a new assumption: the first-differenced variables used as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
instruments for the variables in levels should not be correlated with the unobserved country 
effects 𝛼! in equation (2). In our case, this would require, for example, that the first-
differenced death penalty index or GDP are not correlated with the fixed-effects capturing 
unobserved heterogeneity among countries, which is too strong as an assumption. Moreover, 
as the first-stage regression and the Stock and Yogo's test show, our instruments are not weak.	  
25	  Given that the dynamic model seems to be the appropriate specification for the process 
underlying CO2 emissions, the coefficient estimated in the dynamic model seems more 
reliable.	  
26	  These objective levels were computed using our data on CO2 emissions: a target level of 
emissions in 2025 that is 26% lower than the level in 2005 for the US and a target level of 
emissions in 2030 40% lower than the level in 1990 for the EU.	  
27	  This effect was obtained by assuming constant BAU emissions between 2015 and 2040. If 
BAU emissions were increasing over that period, this effect would have been even bigger.	  
28	  Additionally, we have reduced our sample by limiting the number of years in two different 
ways: (i) we have only considered every five years to break any possible auto-correlation in 
the error term and (ii) we have only considered recent years (i.e. after 1980 and after 1985). 
Results are not presented here but they remain unchanged.	  
29	  The reason is that due to the setting of LRTAP treaties, ratification and entry into force 
coincide (almost to the year) for many countries in our sample.	  
30	  This is the 1979 LRTAP Convention under the auspices of which all subsequent protocols 
are negotiated.	  
31	  In our dataset, 28 countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. Three countries ratified it 
before 2002: Cyprus (1999), Czech Republic and Romania (2001).	  
32	  The damaging effects of acidification in Europe were discovered in the 1960s through their 
effects on Scandinavian fish stocks. These countries were the first to suffer damages from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
transboundary acid rains and they were the first to adopt control on SO2 emissions (primarily 
to encourage others to follow rather than to benefit directly).	  
33	  The reduction of emissions observed in EiTs countries in the 1990s is mainly due to the 
economic collapse in those former Soviet States. It can then be argued that the success of air-
pollution agreements in reducing CO2 emissions is an artifact of those transition countries' 
industrial restructuring.	  
